We investigate whether firm-level political connections affect the allocation of exemptions from the tariffs imposed on $550 billion of Chinese goods imported to the United States annually in 2018 and 2019. We find that firms reporting higher political lobbying expenditures in the prior years are more likely to receive approval for exemptions. Our evidence points to politicians not only rewarding supporters, but also punishing the opposition: past campaign contributions to the party controlling the executive branch increase the likelihood of approval, while past contributions to the party in opposition increase the chance of rejection. Our results strongly point to quid pro quo arrangements between politicians and firms, trading campaign contributions in exchange for tariff exemptions, as opposed to the “information” channel linking access to politicians to regulatory outcomes. Abnormal returns at the announcement of an application reveal that tariff exemptions are valuable to applicants: the announcement of an approval increases the market capitalization of the applicant firm by approximately $51 million, while rejected applications lead to negative abnormal returns. We further document that markets correctly anticipate the higher likelihood of approval of proposals by firms with beneficial political connections, indicating that this quid pro quo arrangement is transparent to market participants.