ESG Metrics in Executive Compensation: a Multitasking Approach

Abstract

We model the multitasking nature of managerial incentives when ESG metrics are introduced jointly with standard financial or accounting metrics in executive compensation. Building on insights from multitasking theory, we predict that pay-performance sensitivity or dollar delta of standard metrics should optimally decrease when value-adding but less measurable ESG goals are introduced in executive pay. Empirical tests support the existence of a significant opportunity cost for the effort of executives to improve ESG metrics that firms mitigate by decreasing incentives to achieve standard metrics. Consistently, the downward adjustment in the dollar delta of standard metrics is shown to be larger when ESG metrics are introduced in larger number, are less material to the firm, or are less measurable. This adjustment is not offset by a simultaneous increase in the time vesting delta or the executive’s total compensation. The tests show a differential effect of E, S, and G metrics on the dollar delta of standard metrics. In sharp contrast, there is no variation in the dollar delta of standard metrics when a new standard metric (instead of an ESG metric) is introduced. Overall, the evidence is consistent with efficient contracting in the presence of multitasking when ESG metrics are introduced in executive compensation.

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